Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

5-19-1953

Barrett v. Claremont [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Barrett v. Claremont [DISSENT]" (1953). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 288.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/288

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

70

BARRE'l'T

lL.

v.

CITY OF CLAREMON''r

A. No. :J2543.

.In Bank.

[41 C.2d

May 19, 1953.]

MARY E. BARRETT, Respondent, v. THE CITY OF
CLAREMONT, Appellant.
[1] Streets- Injuries Caused by Defects- Liability of Municipality.-Elements essential to a recovery against a municipality under the Public Liability Act of 1923 (Stats. 1923,
p. 675; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619; now Gov. Code,
§§ 53050-53056) for injuries resulting from a dangerous or
defective condition of the public streets include proof that a
dangerous condition existed and that the municipality had
notice or knowledge of it.
[2] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Municipality.Since minor defects inevitably occur in construction and maintenance of public streets and their continued existence is not
unreasonable, no liability may result from injuries due to
such a condition irrespective of whether the municipality had
notice of it.
[3] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Liability of Municipality.If defect in public street is of such trivial character that it
presents no element of conspicuousness or notoriety, its continued existence does not impart constructive notice to the
municipality.
[4] Evidence-Judicial Notice-Sidewalks.-It is a matter of common knowledge that it is impossible to maintain a sidewalk in
a perfect condition and that minor defects are bound to exist.
[5] Streets-Injuries Caused by Defects-Defects Involving Liability.-A municipality is not necessarily liable for injuries
caused by minor defects in a sidewalk due to its continued
use, and what constitutes a minor defect is not always a mere
question of fact.
[6] Id.- Injuries Caused by Defects- Evidence.-In action by
pedestrian against city for injuries sustained when she tripped
on ridge of asphaltum filler material protruding above surface
of sidewalk, evidence showing that the asphaltum filler may
become soft and sticky on warm days does not support an
inference that she slipped on the substance.
[7] !d.-Injuries Caused by Defects-Evidence: Questions of Law
and Fact.-In action by pedestrian against city for injuries
sustained when she tripped on ridge of asphaltum filler material
[1] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 461 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Highways, § 348 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Streets, § 71; [4] Evidence, § 62;
[5] Streets, § 78(1); [6] Streets, § 90; [7) Streets, §§ 90, 91(2).
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protruding above surface of sidewalk, no negligence on part
of city is shown by evidence that such ridge, at its highest
point, was only one-half inch above the surface of the sidewalk, and that it did not rise sharply to that height but curved
gradually upward from each edge toward the center, since the
defect must be deemed to be a minor one, and hence it must
be concluded, as a matter of law, that no injury would be sustained by one exercising reasonable care in the use of the sidewalk. (Disapproving Barrett v. City of Sacramento, 128 Cal.
App. 708, 18 P.2d 356.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Victor R. Hansen, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action against city for damages for personal injuries sustained by pedestrian as result of fall due to defect in sidewalk. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions.
Moss, Lyon & Dunn, Sidney A. Moss and Henry F. Walker
for Appellant.
Knight, Gitelson, Ashton & Hagenbaugh, Van Hagenbaugh
and Leon J. Alexander for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-Mary E. Barrett sued the city of Claremont for damages, charging the defendant with negligence
in the construction and maintenance of a public sidewalk.
The injuries which she sustained resulted from a fall occurring when she tripped upon a ridge of asphaltum :filler material protruding above the surface of the walk. Whether
that defect was a trivial or substantial one is the principal
question presented upon the appeal from the judgment against
the city.
In 1938, the city constructed a sidewalk, approximately 10
[(~et wide, consisting of concrete slabs about 4 inches thick.
A space of lf2 inch, extending the entire width of the walk,
was left between the slabs to accommodate changes in temperature. Although standard building practice called for
:filling such space with asphaltum to a height of % to lf2'
inch below the top of contiguous slabs, the :filler in the joint
in question was made level with the surface of the sidewalk.
'rhe black :filler material readily absorbs the rays of the sun.
On warm days, its internal temperature may rise to a point
greatly above that of the surrounding air, causing the material
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to become soft. Warm weather also expands the concrete slabs,
pushing the filler material up and out of the joint. People
using the sidewalk step upon the small ridge created and
spread the material over the sidewalk's surface. As a result
of this process, sufficient asphaltum had been expelled from
the joint upon which Miss Barrett tripped to create a ridge
about 5 inches wide. At the center, its highest point, the ridge
was about ¥2 inch above the surface of the sidewalk and
tapered gradually on each side to the level of the walk.
The accident occurred in the afternoon of a warm day in
June. Because of a crust of dirt and other substances, the
surface of the ridge appeared to be normal but the center was
soft. Miss Barrett, while walking along the sidewalk, caught
her toe upon the strip and fell.
The present action was commenced pursuant to the provisions of the Public Liability Act of 1923 (Stats. 1923,
p. 675; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619; now Gov. Code,
§§ 53050-53056). Her complaint alleged that she had suffered an injury as a result of a dangerous and defective condition of the sidewalk and that the defendant city had notice
of such condition but failed to remedy it. By its answer, the
city denied generally the allegations of the complaint and
pleaded affirmatively the defense of contributory negligence.
A jury awarded Miss Barrett damages. Motions by the city
for a directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial were denied. The appeal is from
the judgment entered upon the verdict.
The city takes the position that, as a matter of law, the
defect must be deemed to have been a minor or trivial one.
Another contention is that the trial court improperly rejected
an offer of proof that the records of the city between 1940 and
1948 would disclose that, with the exception of the claim of
Miss Barrett, no report had been made of an accident having
occurred at that joint or at any other joint in the streets of
the city.
The Public Liability Act of 1923 provides that a municipality shall be liable for injuries resulting from a dangerous
or defective condition of the public streets in all cases where
having notice or knowledge of the condition those persons
having authority to remedy it fail, within a reasonable time,
to do so. [1] Elements essential to a recovery under this
statute include proof that a dangerous condition existed and
that the municipality had notice or knowledge of it. (Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal.2d 361, 363 [54 P.2d 725].)
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[2] A determination of whether the defect involved is a
minor or trivial one may be material to the establishment of
each of these requirements. Growing out of the difficulty of
maintaining heavily traveled surfaces in perfect condition is
the practical recognition that minor defects inevitably occur,
both in construction and maintenance, and that their continued existence is not unreasonable. In such case, irrespective
of the question of notice of the condition, no liability may
result. (Graves v. Roman, 113 Cal.App.2d 584, 586-587 [248
P.2d 508] ; Robson v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 70 Cal.App.2d
759, 761-762 [161 P.2d 821]; Clarke v. Foster's Inc., 51 Cal.
App.2d 411, 414 [125 P.2d 60] ; Sischo v. City of Los Banos,
37 Cal.App.2d 717, 718 [100 P.2d 305].)
[3] The same problem may arise in connection with the
question of notice. In many instances, the plaintiff cannot show
actual notice of the condition and must rely upon the constructive notice imputed to the municipality by the passage
of time. (Hook v. City of Sacramento, 118 Cal.App. 547, 553
[5 P.2d 643]; Dawson v. Tulare Union High Sch., 98 Cal.
App. 138, 142 [276 P. 424] .) The theory of those decisions
is that the city, had it performed its duty of conducting a
reasonable inspection, would have had actual knowledge of
the existence of a dangerous defect. (See Nicholson v. City of
Los Angeles, supra, pp. 364-365.) If the defect is of such
trivial character that it presents no element of conspicuousness or notoriety, its continued existence does not impart constructive notice to the municipality. (Whiting v. City of N ational City, 9 Cal.2d 163, 166 [69 P.2d 990]; Nicholson v.
City of Los Angeles, supra, pp. 367-368; Balmer v. City of
Beverly II ills, 22 CaLA pp.2d 529, 531 [ 71 P .2d 854].)
The plaintiff contends that, in any event, the question
of whether the defect was trivial or substantial is one of fact,
which the jury has resolved in her favor. [4] But, as was said
in Whiting v. City of National City, supra, "[i]t is a matter
of common knowledge that it is impossible to maintain a
sidewalk in a perfect condition. Minor defects are bound to
exist. [5] A municipality cannot be expected to maintain the
surface of its sidewalks free from all inequalities and from
every possible obstruction to travel. Minor defects due to
continued use, or action of the elements, or other cause, will
not necessarily make the city liable for injuries caused thereby. What constitutes a minor defect is not always a mere
question of fact. If the rule were otherwise the city could be
held liable upon a showing of a trivial defect." (P. 165.)
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Miss Rarrett argueR that the physical
asphaltum filler material di&tinguish the present case from
those involving trivial cldect:>. In this connection, she relies
upon Lmtie v. Hagstrom's Food Stm·es, Inc., 81 Cal.App.2d
601 [184 P.2d 708 j, affirming an award of damages for injury
caused by slipping upon a puddle of syrup on the floor of a
grocery store. To bring herself within the rule of that case,
she characterizes the ridge of asphaltum as a "sticky puddle."
[6] The evidence most favorable to Miss Barrett shows
only that the asphaltum filler may become soft and sticky
on warm days. It does not support an inference that she
slipped upon the substance. Her answer to the direct inquiry
of whether she had a sensation of slipping was in the negative.
She stated that, as she stepped upon the ridge in such manner
as to place her full weight upon her rig·ht foot, the tip of her
toe "caught" or "stuck" in the substance, retarding her
forward motion and throwing her off balance.
[7] The record does not show that the small amount of
asphaltum above the level of the sidewalk presented any
greater danger of injury than that disclosed in other trivial
defect cases. The accident occurred on one of the busiest
streets of the city. Miss Barrett had traveled it many times.
At its highest point, the ridge was only lh inch above the
surface of the sidewalk. Moreover, it did not rise sharply
to that height but curved gradually upward from each edge
toward the center, much in the same manner as a common
doorsill. Many decisions hold that defects of a greater magnitude than that shown here are minor ones. (Whiting v. City
of National C-ity, supra [adjoining sidewalk panels differing
in elevation % inch at the highest point] ; Nicholson v. City
of Los Angeles, supra, [1% inches difference in elevation] ;
Sischo v. City of Los Banos, supm [grade in sidewalk of
58/100 inch per foot]; Balmer v. City of Beverly Hills, supra
[1 inch difference in elevation of sidewalk panels] ; Dunn v.
Wagner·, 22 Cal.App.2d 51, 54 [70 P.2d 498] [1 inch rise in
sidewalk]; Meyer v. City of Sam Rafael, 22 Cal.App.2d 46, 50
[70 P.2d 533] [adjoining sidewalk panels varying from %
inch to 1% inches in height].) Accordingly, the defect here
concerned must be deemed to have been one within that category.
In the cases relied upon by the respondent which hold
that the question of negligence is one of fact, either different
circumstances were shown by the record or the question as to
what constitutes a trivial defect was not discussed. (FackreU
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v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.2d 196 [157 P.2d 625, 158 .A.L.R.
625] [pothole in sidewalk from 5 inches to 2 feet deep];
Anderson v. County of Joaquin, llO Cal..App.2d 703 [244
P.2d 75] [chuckhole 2 to 6 inches deep]; Murphy v. County
of Lake, 106 Cal..App.2d 61 [234 P.2d 712] [question of
whether or not defect was a minor one not raised] ;
Warren v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal..App.2d 678 [205 P.2d
719] [hole 2 inches deep, 10 inches square, containing oil and
grease]; Owen v. City of Los Angeles, 82 Cal.App.2d 933
[187 P.2d 860] (hole 9-11 inches long, 4-6 inches wide, and
2-3¥2 inches deep] ; Louie v. Hagstrom's Food Stores, supra
[puddle of syrup on floor, 6 to 8 inches wide]; Maddern v.
City & County of San F'ramcisco, 74 Cal.App.2d 742 [169
P.2d 425] (depression in street 65 to 80 feet long, 10 to 12
feet wide, and 8 to 10 feet deep] ; Sheldon v. City of Los
Angeles, 55 Cal..App.2d 690 [131 P.2d 874] [depression in
sidewalk 1¥2 inches deep J ; Balkwill v. City of Stockton,
50 Cal..App.2d 661 [123 P.2d 596) [hole in sidewalk 5 inches
long, 2 inches wide, and 2 inches deep); Allen v. City of Los
Angeles, 43 Cal..App.2d 65 [110 P.2d 75] [bridge raised 2
inches above sidewalk] ; Ackers v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.
App.2d 50 [104 P.2d 399] [hole in sidewalk 12 inches long,
3 inches wide, and 2 inches deep]; Hook v. City of Sacramento,
supra [hole 2 feet long, 18 inches wide, and 1¥2 inches
deep].) Barrett v. City of Sacramento, 128 Cal..App. 708
[18 P.2d 356], decided prior to the Nicholson and Whiting
cases, is not in harmony with those decisions and is disapproved.
From the minor nature of the defect here concerned
it must be concluded, as a matter of law, that no injury would
be sustained by one exercising reasonable care in the use of
the sidewalk. Accordingly, a finding of negligence on the
part of the city is without support in the evidence.
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
1o grant the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding
Jhe verdict.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CAR'l'ER, ,J.--I dissent.
'fhis case presents a factual situation which is resolved
as a matter of law by the majority, in spite of the finding by
the jury and the trial court on denial of a motion for a new
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trial, and a determination by the unanimous decision of the
District Court of Appeal. I adopt the decision of the District Court of Appeal affirming the judgment on the verdict as ably disposing of the case. (Barrett v. City of Claremont, (Cal.App.) 247 P.2d 113.)
There is no doubt that, under the public liability law (Gov.
Code, § 53050 et seq.), in order for the city to be liable,
there must be a dangerous or defective condition and the city
must have either actual or constructive knowledge thereof.
The majority opinion discusses both of those features but apparently rests its decision on but one, namely, lack of a dangerous or defective condition, and hence, no negligence, because the defect was trivial. More will be said concerning that
issue later.
Both of those issues are determinable, and were properly
determined, by the trier. of fact. We said in Fackrell v. City
of San Diego, 26 Cal.2d 196, 206 [157 P.2d 625, 158 A.L.R.
625] : "Whether a given set of circumstances creates a dangerous or defective condition is primarily a question of fact.''
The test as to whether it becomes a question of law is stated
in Owen v. City of Los Angeles, 82 Cal.App.2d 933, 938
[187 P.2d 860] : " . . . whether a condition is defective or
clangerotts is one which calls for the application of the rule
that where there is room for difference of opinion among
reasonable minds, the question is one of fact." (Emphasis
added.) Here, the jury, the learned trial judge and three able
justices of the District Court of Appeal-all possessing reasonable minds-concluded that reasonable minds could conclude
that the defect was dangerous. The principle is cogently
stated in Stone v. New York C. &; St. L. R. Co., 344 U.S.
407 [73 S.Ct. 358, 97 L.Ed. 441, 445], where the court
was dealing with the question of negligence. 'While there were
three dissenters, they did not disagree with the principle here
involved. The court said: ''The standard of liability is negligence. . . . Tu us it appears to be a debatable issue on which
fm:r-m1:nded men would differ . . . . Those circumstances were
for the trier of facts to appraise." (Emphasis added.) Applying those rules to the instant case compels the conclusion that
reasonable minds-'' fair-minded men' '-could conclude that
the defect was a dangerous one.
In fact, the soft tarry substance became not only a dangerous condition by its protuberance above the sidewalk but
was a trap for the unwary. It would look substantial to a
pedestrian but, being soft and sticky, the pedestrian would, as
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plaintiff did here, unknowingly step on it and her foot would
sink in. 'rhere was sufficient cohesive quality to cause her
foot to stick, at least momentarily. That was enough to throw
her off her stride and result in an imbalance and fall. Certainly,
reasonable men could call such a condition dangerous and defective.
In the foregoing discussion, I have accepted the facts as
stated by the majority as complete,-that is, that there was
a 1;2-inch high asphalt hump across the sidewalk which arose
by reason of that substance being placed between the slabs of
concrete in a crevice left therefor to accommodate the expansion and contraction; that the common standard practice is
to install the asphalt in the crevice to a point % inch below
the surface of the sidewalk. That was not done here ; the
city caused the asphalt to be flush with the sidewalk surface.
Thus it definitely appears that the sidewalk was negligently
constructed from the beginning, being contrary to the standard
practice. Deviation from custom or standard practice may
constitute negligence (19 Cal.Jur. 581-583). The jury could
have so found here. The evidence shows that it is the tendency
of asphalt to work upward and out of a crevice and not return.
'l'hat is what happened here to the extent of % inch. If it had
been properly installed it would have worked upward only to
the surface of the sidewalk. We have, therefore, negligence
in the installation of the asphalt and it necessarily follows
that the city knew of it because it made that installation itself.
There is even more evidence of knowledge. The city's superintendent of streets testified that the condition of the asphalt
in and on this sidewalk had been the same since 1940. Thus
the city had double actual knowledge of the defective condition.
Under the foregoing circumstances, there is no room for the
application of the "trivial" defect exception to liability because, if it were applied, the city would escape liability where
it knowingly created and maintained a dangerous defect as
long as it was small. Indeed, it could create as many and as
dangerous pitfalls as it wished and be subject to no liability
when it kept them unobstrusive. No such strained construction of the public liability act should be indulged.
'rhe trivial defect rule is court-made, as the statute makes
no distinction between dangerous or defective conditions aceording to their magnitude, and in most of the cases, it has
been relied upon to hold that there could not be constructive
notice where the defect was minor (see Nicholson v. City of
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Los
5 Cal.2d 361 [54 P .2d
) . In this case, as
the
had actual notice~the facts conabove
elusively establish it. Therefore, the rule of the Nicholson
case is not applicable here.
As to its applicability on the question of whether the
condition is dangerous or defective, we also have direct evidence, as seen from the foregoing, that the condition was defective ancZ fraught with danger. The majority seeks to escape
the result of that evidence by stating that there are cases
which hold that a defect may be so trivial that it does not
constitute a dangerous condition. In none of those cases,
however, was the defect actually known or created by the
defendant, and for that reason, it was held that defendant
need not anticipate an injury arising from it. The basic case
that the majority relies upon is Whiting v. City of National
City, 9 Cal.2d 163 [69 P.2d 990], which was concerned solely
with the question of notice, rather than whether a defect may
be so trivial as to constitute no hazard. Where, as here, the
city had actual knowledge of the defect and knew that the
construction was contrary to standard practice, there is no
basis whatsoever for saying that it could not anticipate an
injury. No question is presented as to whether the city, as
a responsible person, should have anticipated the injury, because, in view of its knowledge it must have expected it.
Moreover, it is firmly established that a dangerous or defective condition may be the basis for liability by the use of
a general plan of operation of city operated property as well
as by a structural defect. (George v. City of Los Angeles,
11 Cal.2d 303 [79 P.2d 72:3] ; Battman v. San Franciseo, 42
Cal.App.2d 144 [108 P.2d 989]; Wexler v. City of Los Angeles, 110 Cal.App.2d 740 [243 P.2d 868].) That situation
is presented here because the method of construction of the
sidewalk was contrary to the accepted standard.
:B'inaJly, there is a basis for the jury's verdict which is not
mentioned in the majority opinion. There was a strip of
asphalt on the sidewalk. It is a tarry substance which, on
warm days, becomes soft and sticky. The accident occurred
on a warm day. The surface of the asphalt appeared gray
in color, concealing its lack of firmness and adhesive character. The city knew all of those things yet permitted the
condition to exist. Plaintiff stepped on this asphalt and the
toe of her shoe momentarily adhered to the asphalt, retarding
the forward motion of her foot, thus throwing her off balance
and into a fall. That makes out a case of negligence against
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defendant. It is indistinguishable from the slippery floor
cases where wax has been applied to the floor. There the injured person slips and falls. Here, one foot is retarded for
sufficient time to destroy her balance and a fall results. It
is settled that where a floor is made slippery by the application of wax, the possessor of the property is liable for injury
to a business visitor who slips and falls on the floor. (Hatfield
v. Levy Brothers, 18 Oal.2d 798 (117 P.2d 841] ; Lorenz v.
Santa Monica etc. Sch. Dist., 51 CaLApp.2d 393 (124 P.2d
846] ; Nicola v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 50 Cal. App.2d 612 [123
P.2d 529]; Williamson v. Hardy, 47 Cal.App. 377 (190 P.
646] ; Lamb v. Purity Stores, Inc., 119 Oal.App. 690 [7 P.2d
197] ; Brinkworth v. Sam Seelig Co., 51 Cal.App. 668 [197 P.
427]; Brown v. Holzwasser, Inc., 108 Cal.App. 483 [291 P.
661]; Henderson v. Progressive etc. System., 57 Cal.App.2d 180
[134 P.2d 807); Cagle v. Bakersfield Medical Grottp, 110 Cal.
App.2d 77 [241 P.2d 1013] .) Those cases also hold that
whether maintenance of the slippery floor is negligence is for
the trier of fact. If the maintenance of a slippery condition is
negligence so is the maintenance of a sticky surface as either
condition may cause injury.
The majority enunciates no rule, fixes no standard, establishes no basis for determining what condition constitutes
a trivial defect for which there is no liability, or for the determination of what is a dangerous and defective condition
for which liability may be imposed. The trier of fact-the
jury or trial judge-is required to speculate as to what four
members of this court may ultimately conceive to be a dangerous and defective condition within the purview of the
public liability statute. Even though the jury and trial judge
may have viewed the premises, the result would be the same.
Without some standard for the determination of what constitutes a dangerous and defective condition, there is nothing
to guide the trial court and jury in any case.
The traditional rule that, ·where the factual situation is such
that reasonable minds might differ, the issue is one of fact, is
ignored by the majority. It must necessarily ignore this rule,
because to apply it in the case at bar, would require the majority to say that the jury, the trial judge and the three justices of the Distriet Court of Appeal who ruled in favor of
plaintiff, did not have reasonable minds. To avoid this absurd
holding, the majority predicates its decision on its own concept of what is a dangerous and defective condition, and
holds that notwithstanding the finding of the jury, the trial
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judge and the unanimous decision of the District Court of
Appeal, the defect here proven did not constitute a dangerous
and defective condition even though plaintiff suffered a serious
injury as a result of such defect. In other words, the only
standard is what the majority of this court fixes in each indiYiclual case. This is not announcing a rule of law-it is a
rule of four men-who may be for the time being, men who
have a preconceived notion in cases such as this, and who are
disposed to usurp the function of the jury and trial judge in
a grasp for power-power denied them by the Constitution
and laws of this state. Because the Constitution and laws
of this state guarantee to litigants in a case such as this, the
right to trial by jury, which means that factual issues are to
be determined by the jury. Those factual issues were so determined, and in view of the ruling of the trial court in
denying a motion for a new trial and the decision of the District Court of Appeal affirming that ruling, that determination
should be final.
As I have heretofore pointed out, this court is presented
with numerous propositions of law of tremendous importance
to the people of this state, the determination of which would
consume all of the time available to the members of this court,
without undertaking to review and redeeide issues of fact,
and I again state that cases such as this, involving only issues
of fact, and which were correctly decided by the trial court and
the District Court of Appeal, should not have been taken over
and redecided by this court.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 11,
1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

